Baseball

It doesn’t fit for this front office to say they put on a show to justify making the choice they wanted to make the entire time anyway. Maybe they did, but while they don’t always get it right, I would be hard-pressed to ever accuse Theo Epstein’s regime of not being thorough. I don’t think there’s any move they’ve made where they were just tossing a football around the office, never even looked at a sheet or screen, and said, “Yeah sure whatever.”

So I don’t think the two interviews for David Ross were just for the sake of doing it because they gave Joe Espada two interviews. I don’t think they were just making it seem like they were doing their due diligence while they actually just got drunk with Ross and made fun of ESPN personalities (which probably did happen in addition, to be fair). My guess would be they put Ross through a pretty heavy ringer to be comfortable giving him the manager’s job.

Does the familiarity help? Sure, of course. But that goes both ways. The only thing I’m sure of with the Cubs’ manager search is they wanted a guy who will run the team in the same vision they have for it as they put it together. That doesn’t mean they’ll be calling down to the dugout during the game and telling Ross or whoever else they might have hired what to do. But when they put together this team this winter, whatever and however that’s going to be, anyone would have a clear idea of how they want the pieces moved on the board. Whether that vision is correct or not…well, that’s what a baseball season is for.

So yeah, they probably want their bullpen used more creatively than 7th- and 8th-inning guy, and then closer. Especially as it’s likely to have at least two guys–Alzolay and Chatwood–who can be used for multiple innings. They probably want that in close games, not just mop-up situations or when there’s no other option. They want a different environment for younger players, as this one kind of stalled out for some (assuming they can actually play). They probably don’t want Albert Almora leading off ever again. They want things to definitely be tighter than they were this year.

But for anyone to say, “Oh Ross will do this or that. Or he’ll bring this or that to the clubhouse…” We don’t have any idea. He doesn’t have any idea. Neither does Theo. We can guess and they might have a stronger inkling thanks to the interviews and their relationship with him, but no one knows.

Sure, he doesn’t have any experience. But he also spent his entire career as a backup catcher, which means he spent most of his career watching from the dugout, seeing how things play out. And if he thought he wanted to be a manager at any point, which he obviously did, it was probably in that context at some point long ago.

Yes, he has a relationship with some of the players, and all of the core. Maybe that means he holds them accountable better. Maybe it means he thinks he’s still their buddy. Maybe it means he knows exactly how to get through to them and immediately get on board and bring the rest of the team with them. We don’t know, and probably won’t until July.

Maybe he sets a harsher tone. He was a great clubhouse leader as a player. I mean, everyone says so. Except that all of those things that made him so are things we never saw. We take their word for it. The volume of it makes it probably true, but how does that play as a boss? He acted as something of a conduit from the manager to the players in both Boston and Chicago, so he’s not unfamiliar. But I’m not going to take him yelling at Anthony Rizzo one time in spring training as a basis for how he’ll run an entire team for an entire season and more.

But the tangible stuff? We don’t have any idea. Can he get players to change their approach at times? A few hitting coaches have failed at it now, so why will Ross be any different? He could. He might not. We don’t know. Can Ross make Quintana discover a new pitch or new way of delivering one of the ones he has to find more success? Maybe? Who knows?

Ross will probably look like a good manager if he gets a starter to slot either right below or right in the middle of Kyle Hendricks and Yu Darvish and definitely above Q and Jon Lester, along with two more bullpen arms. I bet he looks pretty smart then. Oh, and Ian Happ hits out of center and Nico Hoerner is ready to take over at second by no later than Memorial Day.

All we can say for sure is that in those interviews, the outline or vision Ross had for how this team should look and be deployed lined up with what the front office sees. But we don’t know what that vision is, they’re not going to tell us. We’ll find out during the season.

My fear is that Ross’s name and esteem amongst Cubs fans and media is part of the appeal, in that he’ll buy some breathing room and time for the rest of the organization in case they have plans they know we won’t like. That’s probably some of the appeal, but not all.

But in the end, we don’t know. We’ll fill this vacuum of nothing with our thoughts and opinions and most of all our guesses because there’s nothing else to do and you can’t leave a vacuum a vacuum, duh. But you don’t know. I don’t know. They don’t know.

And by the time we do know, it could be too late. Or it could be perfect. It could be anything. That can be exciting. That can be daunting. Again, anything.

Baseball

For most of the season, the story or narrative around Jason Heyward was that he’d finally come good with the bat. There seemed to be more power, there were better ABs, so much so that he got himself elevated to the leadoff spot. Where he was a crime against nature. And as the season went along, and we came to realize the flubber contained within the baseball, Heyward’s season didn’t seem to be so much a revival as it was just riding along with the tide. And in the end, it was pretty much the same completely average offensive season 2018 was. Except it didn’t come with stellar defense, though that really wasn’t his fault. Let’s take a trip, take a little trip…

2019 Stats

147 games, 598 PAs

.251/.343/.429

21 HR  78 RBI

11.5 BB%  18.7 K%

101 wRC+  .343 wOBA  .772 OPS

-1.7 Defensive Runs Saved  1.9 WAR

Tell Me A Story: On the plus side, Heyward’s 21 homers are by far the most he’s hit as a Cub. His on-base was the best of his Cubs career. His slugging was, again, the highest of his career on the Northside. So that all sounds good. The problem is that EVERYONE was hitting more homers than they had in years, which raised the slugging percentage of just about anyone. So when you look at league averaging stats like wRC+ or OPS+, Heyward’s doesn’t stand out in the least.

Still, there are some caveats. Heyward’s August was simply woeful (58 wRC+), but that’s where he was installed in the leadoff spot. Now, I’m not sure why batting somewhere else should make any difference, because the idea is still the same. Have a good AB, try to get on base, and try to hit the ball hard if you can. But it obviously does, and because it’s become such a Bermuda Triangle area for the Cubs, there might even be a bigger mental block for anyone trying to take it on. We’ll just leave it as something weird just happens there. When batting 5th, 6th, or 7th, Heyward’s wRC+ was 162, 120, and 101.

Second, if only against righties, Heyward’s numbers look really good. .350 wOBA and a 115 wRC+. And seeing as how he had 112 PAs against lefties, you can certainly say he was trotted out against southpaws just far too often. You don’t want to admit Heyward is just a platoon player based on his paycheck, but we can see how the season played out. It’s what he is. Perhaps the next manager will see these, or more likely be shown these, and only keep Heyward in spots where he has success.

Heyward saw a big jump in his walks this year, but also a pretty big drop in his contact numbers. His contact-rates were still above league average, though. There was an uptick, and not a small one, in his swinging strikes. A small crawl up in that category in fastballs is worrying for a player who crossed the threshold into his 30s, because that doesn’t tend to get better as a player ages (what does though, really?). The bigger uptick is whiffs on sliders is also a warning sign, as it might suggest Heyward was starting to inch a little more into cheating on fastballs, or getting there. At least trying to get started earlier, which left him susceptible to pitches that look like a fastball until breaking down.

Perhaps the most worrying aspect of Heyward’s season is the drop in defense. But that almost all comes from his shift to center, which started even before the acquisition of Nicholas Castellanos, as Albert Almora‘s skeleton fell out and forced more people into right as Heyward moved to center so the Cubs could get any offense out of those spots. Heyward still grades out above average in right. He wasn’t a disaster in center, but he’s not a plus fielder there. Which is why some like me have argued against re-signing Castellanos, because the outfield defense would be so bad. We’ll see how the Cubs feel about it. Again, as he moves into his 30s, it’s not very likely that Heyward is going to get better in center, and probably not even in right field. But he can be a plus right fielder for a while yet, you’d think.

Contract: $21M in 2020, signed through 2023. Has opt-out.

Welcome Back Or Boot In The Ass: The Cubs don’t have much of a choice here obviously. Heyward is not going to opt-out, unless he’s the nicest guy in the world. Trading him isn’t really an option either, unless some team sees intangibles that only they can see and Heyward is moved to agree to such a move. And why would he? Also, his adult presence in the clubhouse probably shouldn’t be overlooked, as the Cubs don’t have a lot of vets who’ve been around long enough to be comfortable voicing anything.

So he’s going to be on the team, and that’s not a bad thing as long as he’s only asked to do what he does well. Which is play right field, hit in the back half of the order, and only against righties. That probably affects what the Cubs will do this offseason, as they’ll need to find someone(s) who can play right and center against left-handed pitchers (which might keep Happ around?). If they keep crowbarring Heyward in the lineup against lefties and/or in center, they’re going to have some if not all the same results.

As Heyward ages, he’s going to have to adjust to get to more fastballs somehow. Shorten or quicken his swing, which is hard to do at his age and something he’s already tried to do once. Being vulnerable against sliders is probably only going to be more of a feature in the coming years. It won’t wreck him yet, though, or it shouldn’t. Heyward is still a plus to have on the team if used properly.

Baseball

As the Cubs have searched for a manager, and my fears about the offseason in general grow thanks to having far too much time on my hands and struggling to escape the cynicism of my youth, one thing I’ve tried to reassure myself with is that it’s not really in Theo Epstein’s DNA to do something completely moronic. Something you’d see the Mets or Edmonton Oilers do. Sure, some moves haven’t worked out or not gone as well as hoped, but almost every one of them you could see the logic behind at the time. The math added up.

Except for his first draft pick here in Chicago. That might have been a complete and utter whiff. Seems to be a theme in Chicago sports these days.

2019 Stats

130 games, 363 PAs

.236/.271/.381

12 HR  41 RBI

4.4 BB%  17.1 K%

64 wRC+  .271 wOBA  .651 OPS

-1.1 Defensive Runs Saved  -0.7 WAR

Tell Me A Story: This season started much like 2018 did, with a lot of people contending–even screaming from the truly unhinged–that what Albert Almora Jr. really needed was just consistent playing time. That being jerked in and out of the lineup and never starting more than three days in a row, if that, was stunting his development. It ended just like 2018 did, where it’s pretty clear that there isn’t anything to develop.

There was only one stretch of the season where Almora looked like a Major Leaguer, and that was May with a 107 wRC+. That was almost entirely due to hitting six homers in the month, and seeing as how he managed six more in the other five months, one wouldn’t count on that to happen too often again, if ever at all.

This is where the “WE NEED CONTACT” Big Audio Dynamite tribute argument kind of falls flat for me, though it’s cherry-picking admittedly. Albert Almora makes plenty of contact. He doesn’t walk much, but he doesn’t strike out much either. The problem is almost all of that contact is soft, and most of it is on the ground. So where does that get you? A negative-WAR player’s what it gets you. But hey, if you think the answers to the Cubs problems are having more guys ground out to short more often, well you go as far as you can with that, Big Shooter.

To be fair to AA, his hard-contact rate in July and August was actually pretty good, and his ground-ball rate declined throughout the season. But that’s also when his playing time dried up, which he also earned, so it’s hard to tell if that’s progress or just a few spasmed ABs out of a shallowing collection of them. And I don’t think the Cubs are going to bother to find out anyway.

If Almora was taken in the first round due to his athleticism, and you’d never followed him before, you’d swear he suffered some sort of bad knee injury in the minors or something. He’s slow, and he doesn’t have natural power because he doesn’t really have that much bat-speed. Even his instincts, which somehow had him stumble into being a decent centerfielder, went away this year as he graded out negatively in the field. Which would lead one to ask what it is he does at all. And that would be a question no one has an answer for right now, other than really upgrade the hair in the clubhouse.

But he rescues dogs, so he’s a good guy.

Contract: Team Control, Arbitration eligible in 2021

Welcome Back Or Boot In The Ass: Well, he can’t be on the team next year. All he’s earned is a fifth-outfielder role and if the Cubs have any hope, however slim, that Almora can develop into anything he’s not going to do it with four ABs a week. What the Cubs probably need to do, because he has options left and they never actually let him do it before calling him up, is play full-time in AAA for a full season. Or most of it. Almora never hit in the minors before joining the 2016 team. He just had a glove and promise. Now he doesn’t seem to have either. He’ll get you nothing in a trade, and I doubt you could even make him a throw-in to another deal at this point. He costs nothing, so there’s not much harm in letting him get at least three or four months in Des Moines to play every day and see if he can’t discover something, while Happ and Heyward and possibly an acquisition figure out centerfield at Wrigley.

At 26 at the beginning of next season, you don’t want to say that there’s no hope for Almora. But also by 26 we should have seen something, anything, to suggest there’s anything to be excavated out of him. Have you? No, you haven’t. And he’s not going to get faster, which probably means the defense is going to struggle to be plus before too long. If that ship hasn’t sailed already.

Maybe a new manager can whisper something to him, and stop putting him in spots to fail like Maddon had a habit of doing (he’s leading off again, is he Joe? How does Binny’s pay you exactly?). But everything with Almora needs to be considered a longshot at this point. And before too long, it’ll probably be in another uniform.

Baseball

WITNESS ME BLOODBAG!

2019 Stats

155 games, 610 plate appearances

.250/.339/.531

38 HR  82 RBI

11.5 BB%  25.6 K%

120 wRC+  .357 wOBA  .871 OPS

-7.1 Defensive Runs Saved  2.4 WAR

Tell Me A Story: There probably isn’t a better lesson in development not being linear than Kyle Schwarber. It was a given after his Doomsday 2nd half in 2015 that Schwarber would be taking aim and eventually bringing down the scoreboard in right field. But it didn’t work that way, as The War Bear got hurt, then spent ’17 and ’18 going through the growing pains he was supposed to go through in 2016. There was the cursed leadoff spot (which I will still contend he was good at and could be again if the Cubs really needed him to be). It got to the point where some fans and media had given up on him. And hell, it even took until the second half of this season for people to be convinced that Schwarber was going to be anything like we thought he would.

Overall, Schwarber’s season is really good. If you were to focus on just the second half, where he slashed .280/.366/.631 for a wRC+ of an astronomic 151 (for comparison, a season-long 151 would have ranked 7th in all of baseball right behind Anthony Rendon), then it’s really ya-ha time. The question for Schwarber and the Cubs and all of us is whether or not Schwarber is that guy from just the second half. Of course, most teams would settle for the whole of ’19 from their left fielder. Perspective is king, people.

There isn’t too much to suggest it simply can’t be. His BABIP in the second half was .287, which is high for Schwarbs simply due to the shifts he sees but hardly out of line by league-average standards. His hard-contact rate was above 40% in both halves of the season, which would suggest he was a touch unlucky in the first more than lucky in the second (though somewhat boosted by the 54% hard-contact rate he had in September). And nothing really changed about his approach, as the direction of his hits and contact remained pretty steady from first half to second half. And on a team that had trouble hitting the ball hard, Schwarber ranked 9th in all of MLB in average exit velocity. You wouldn’t get that long of odds on him repeating the second half for a full season, let’s say.

If there’s a problem area for Schwarber, it had been breaking balls. And overall, his numbers on sliders and curves this year aren’t impressive. But at the end of the year, in September, he blistered them for a .308 average and a .373 wOBA. Now maybe that’s just a one month spike, or maybe it’s an adjustment to how pitchers adjusted after getting weary of seeing their fastballs and sinkers turned into confetti somewhere over the right field wall. We’ll need more than a month to know, but it’s at least an encouraging start.

Could it actually get better? Maybe? The thing is Kyle’s walk-rate was the lowest of his career, at a still more than decent 11.8%. It was over 15% the year before, and over 13% in his rookie year. There are more walks in there. Some of that is Kyle being a little more willing to go get things a little outside because he can still do things with those pitches, But if he’d had ’18’s walk-rate this year he would have had 23 more walks, which would have boosted his OBP from .339 to .375. There is more in there in that sense. That would see his OPS crack .900 for the year, which is where we all picture The War Bear to be.

The concern with Schwarber, as it is with pretty much everyone now, is the lack of contact. Both his in-zone and overall contact rates were below league-average, and we know the Cubs would like to boost this where they can. I would think Schwarber’s overall production, especially in the second half, would outweigh that, but what do I know? And on breaking pitches, Schwarbs still has some swing-and-miss problems. That’s going to have to be the next step.

The other knock on Schwarber was his historic and mystifying incompetence in high-leverage situations last year. Well that certainly improved this year from -62 (my brain bleeds just seeing that number) to 92 in wRC+. Of course, even in his great second half, that number was just 81 in those spots. Perhaps that’s because pitchers, at least the ones able to execute a plan, know where to go with Schwarbs when they have to get him out. This is clearly the thing he’s going to have to correct come next year.

The funny thing with Schwarber is that even with his improved offensive numbers, he had a lesser WAR than ’18. That’s because his defense didn’t grade out as highly. And that’s because he didn’t really get the chance to throw out runners this year, as the book is out on his arm. Much like Willson Contreras, he contributed to his own sliding metrics on defense because of how good he was at one thing that he negated more chances to do that one thing. We know he’s not a great left fielder. Probably not even a good one. We also know a team doesn’t need to be great in left.

Contract: 2nd of three arbitration years, projected at $8M.

Welcome Back Or Boot In The Ass: There are whispers about trading Schwarber to the AL every goddamn year. I’m sure this won’t be different. And it’s not that he’s untouchable. For a top of the rotation starter, you’d have to think long and hard about it. But that’s about it, at least to me. We got a half season of the hitter he can be, and was in 2015. So this isn’t like it came from nowhere. He’s an adjustment or two from being one of the most dangerous hitters in the league. And even with the arbitration more thandoubling his salary, he’s cheap and young. True, for the first time since 2015, he’ll actually have some real value. But other teams would be wary of a backslide. And if you move Schwarber you have to replace that production in left. There really isn’t an in-house candidate, other than Ian Happ who is a lot farther from being that hitter than Schwarber is. To do it from the outside would be expensive, even if it’s everyone’s darling Castellanos. And if the budget is selfishly and callously limited again, then what room there is has to find pitching first.

As with everything, it depends on return. But the chance the Cubs regret moving Schwarber along rather than enjoy what they got back seems a lot bigger than the reverse.

Baseball

Folks, I’m gonna be honest with you. I fear the end of the World Series. And I fear it because the day after and every single day after that I’m going to wake up thinking, “Today is the day the Cubs are going to do something truly stupid.” And really, what I’m thinking of, at the top of the list at least, is that they’ll trade Kris Bryant. It would be just about the biggest mistake the Cubs could make, save Mookie Betts coming the other way and being signed long-term. Which won’t happen. You do a rebuild, and flog whatever you can for prospects and picks hoping that just one of those picks or prospects will turn into a Kris Bryant. You don’t keep doing that cycle. They don’t come around that often. You can’t just find another one because you want to. They are unicorns, which is possibly why Bryant sparkles in the way he does.

Was Bryant’s year the best? No. For the second year in a row he dealt with nagging injuries which hampered his production. Once again, he was forced to play through it because the rest of the team was too helpless to pull away or then even compete in the division. And the Cubs medical staff working its magic again. Is this the new normal? I doubt it, but I guess you can’t eliminate it. Anyway, let’s run it through.

2019 Stats

147 games  634 PA

.282/.382/.521

31 HR  77 RBI

11.7 BB%  22.9K%

135 wRC+  .379 wOBA  .903 OPS

-4.1 Defensive Runs Saved  4.8 WAR

Tell Me A Story: Well, first of all, 2019 was a huge improvement on 2018. Slugging up 60 points, wOBA up 20 points, 18 more homers. Also played 45 more games. But also for the second straight season, Bryant’s season did not measure up to his first three years in the league where he was Galactus, Eater Of Worlds. How much his knee problem played into that, we just don’t know for sure. But we can guess.

April was a bit rough for Bryant. He only hit .230, but had a high walk-rate and one of his lower K-rates. He was also undone by some fiendish BABIP kung-fu treachery, with a .263 mark. That would be by far the lowest mark of any month in the season. And that explains most of it, as Bryant was carrying a hard-contact rate of just about 40% in the season’s opening, and a line-drive rate over 20%. He was just unlucky.

We know that, because everything corrected over the next three months. In May, June, and July, Bryant ran wRC+ numbers of 193, 140, and 132, the kind of dominance and destruction you know and love from #17. He slugged .719, .480, and .547. This is what it’s supposed to look like.

And then it goes to shit in August, right about the time Bryant hurt his knee. A 95 wRC+. His walks basically disappeared to a 8.5% mark. His hard-contact rate dropped to 25%, and his line-drive rate was simply a sad and lonely (Secret Machines rule!) 12.7%. And yet he played through it. He shouldn’t have, but he did.

Now his September numbers look like they rebounded. But there’s a caveat there. His numbers in September are buffeted by simply going Donkey Kong on PCP and no one took the mallet away on the Pirates in that three-game series where it looked like things might actually come correct. He went 7-for-14, with three homers. After that, he had three hits against the Reds and Cardinals and then his season was over. The knee was still a problem.

There’s a lot of teeth-gnashing about Bryant’s contact numbers, because the team as a whole didn’t make enough contact. But the thing is that Bryant made the same exact amount of contact this year that he did in his MVP year. Had he not gotten hurt in August, and carried out his middle three months the final two, and ended up with 6.0 WAR or so, no one would give a shit about Bryant’s contact rates.

When looking at how Bryant did against certain pitches, most everything in 2019 is in line with what he did in his career before. There’s been basically no change except for health. So unless the Cubs know or heavily suspect that his body is never going to be quite right, he’s going to be an MVP candidate again very soon as long as something doesn’t go TWANG!

If there’s one area of concern other than his health, it’s his defense. It was negative again, though not as bad as the previous season. Still, Bryant was a plus 3rd basemen in his first three years, and one wonders if health was a part of his not being so again. There is a worry about a 6-5 dude playing third long-term. But Bryant isn’t much better in the outfield either, even though his athleticism keeps him from being anything like a disaster out there. Again, we won’t have an answer on this until he completes another full season healthy.

Contract: 3rd arbitration year of four, projected at $18.5M

Welcome Back Or Boot In The Ass: Welcome back forever. Go to Scott Boras and hand Bryant $30-$35M a year until he’s 35 and don’t ask any questions. The idea that the Cubs “can’t” re-sign Bryant is simply ludicrous. Just hand him the most money, which he deserves. There are maybe four players you’d trade him for? Betts is one. Trout’s another. They’re not coming. Neither is Jose Altuve. I can’t stress this enough. Since he came into the league, the only more valuable players than Bryant–even with the injuries–are Trout and Betts. That’s it. You don’t let these players leave unless you’re insane or insanely greedy or both (and the Ricketts family is very likely both of those). He should be here until he retires, and then his jersey should immediately go up the left field foul pole. No waiting around. You simply don’t cut these guys adrift.

There is no way, none, where this team gets better without Bryant. At least not one that’s even a possibility. I’m fairly sure Theo knows this, but the question is can he sell that to the owners? That’s the only obstacle. Hold me to this, but if Bryant is ever allowed to leave, it’ll be at least twice as bad as when Greg Maddux was. I’ll wear it, and so will the rest of us if it happens.

Baseball

Ah, finally we get to have some fun like the Sox guys are. Other than Anthony Rizzo, the players we’ve looked at so far either had iffy or debatable seasons and/or might end up trade bait. Or they’re just irretrievable assholes. But Javier Baez is pure energy. He’s The Drej, but in a good way.

Where the fuck did I dig that reference up? Like maybe four of you saw “Titan A.E.” Whatever. Let’s move along.

2019 Stats

138 games  561 PA

.281/.318/.531

29 HR  89 RBI

5.0 BB%  27.8 K%

114 wRC+  .347 wOBA  .847 OPS

15.7 Defensive Runs Saved  4.4 WAR

Tell Me A Story: It might be hard to separate the decline, however small, of Baez’s ’19 from his ’18 from the pure exhaustion he assuredly felt. And that almost certainly would have had to contribute to his injury problems which basically had him out all of September. Sure, you don’t fracture your thumb because you’re tired as Baez did, but the dip from the first half to the second half was clear and his heel problem was at least partially due to overuse.

In the season’s first two months, Baez didn’t really drop from his MVP-consideration form of last year, putting up a 138 wRC+ in April and a 124 in May. But something went off the boil in June, and Baez didn’t really ever get back to the heights of the season’s first third. Part of it was that Baez simply stopped walking, which he had been doing within at least emailing distance of league average in the first two months. Now we know with Baez the walks are the outlier and the 2.0% rates of June and July are probably closer to what he is. But he doesn’t have to be.

Luck was also a part of it, as in June Baez only had a BABIP of .257 which is some 80 points off his career mark and season mark. That recovered in July and August, and Baez still slugged over .500 in those months, but it wasn’t as dominant as it had been before. Mostly because Baez just wasn’t getting on base as much, though when he was it almost always was for extra bases, and even those handful of walks he eschewed were making a difference. Baez isn’t ever going to be Adam Dunn or Anthony Rendon and he doesn’t have to be. But a walk-rate of 5-6% makes a huge difference to his overall OBP and offense, and that isn’t beyond him.

There was also a big difference in contact for Baez after the season’s first two months. Whereas in April and May he was hitting the ball as hard as just about anyone (43.4% and 51.6% hard-contact rates), he never got over 40% in the final three months he played. Part of this could have been playing every day slowing the bat a touch, part of it could have been the heel, part of it something else. 2018 saw him with a 22% line-drive rate, and we know what Baez should look like when on song. He had some pretty sad line-drive numbers in both June and August.

We know something must be wrong physically, because Baez’s average exit-velocity on fastballs went from 94.5 MPH in July to 85 MPH in August. That just shouldn’t happen. And it’s not like he was seeing more or less of them when August hit.

One thing pitchers did do was move their fastballs from high and tight to the outside, which would seem weird given that Baez has huge power the opposite way:

But Baez never really adjusted, sending less than 20% of his contact the other way which rocketed his ground-ball rate to 59% in August, by far his highest monthly mark of the year. This should never happen to Javy given the damage he can do to right field, but he gets pull-happy at times. In the season’s first two months, when over a third of his contact went to right field, you’ve seen the numbers. This is something Javy needs to lock in.

Contract: 2nd arbitration year, projected for $9.3M in 2020

Welcome Back Or Boot In The Ass: Welcome him back and never let him go. The Cubs have made noises about at least talking about an extension with Baez this winter, and he seems to be the only lock of the team’s core that will never see another uniform. There are trade whispers about Bryant and Contreras, Rizzo will be in his 30s when his contract is up, and Schwarber also will hear the trade winds blow. But the Cubs wouldn’t dare do that with Baez, though they should probably feel the same way about Bryant. Another talk coming soon. What that number would be to get Baez to sign is open to question, but you’d have to guess it starts somewhere around $22M a year. Baez and close friend Francisco Lindor probably will have some interesting conversations about this. Hopefully they’re about both playing in Wrigley together one day.

What will be interesting is how Baez meshes with a new manager. Joe Maddon saw exactly what Baez could be and never really meddled, knowing it would be a bumpy road at times until this was unveiled. A lot of other managers might have tried to shackle or smooth out Baez’s game, which would have been a waste. He’s now at least close to the finished project, so the new manager doesn’t have many decisions to make. But could he resist? Can a new manager keep Baez at least aware of going the other way at the plate, which makes him basically a doomsday device?

The other thing is getting him backup. He can’t play 155 games next year or something stupid like that, even if he wants to. Nico Hoerner being able to stick early in the season solves this, but that’s no guarantee. Giving Bote a spot-start or two there is a solution that Maddon never wanted to try. If Russell’s evil and dumb ass is catapulted into the nearest tire fire, the Cubs might have to find a cheap solution outside the organization. If they don’t, we’ll know how much they think of Hoerner already.

Either way, Engine #9 is most likely going to be thrilling you for a very long time. Keep him fresh and healthy to make sure that happens.

Previous Cubs Player Reviews

Ian Happ

Barf Bag

Ben Zobrist

David Bote

Anthony Rizzo

Victor Caratini 

Willson Contreras

 

Baseball

I don’t think there’s a player I’m more confounded by than Ian Happ. And that’s because one week I’ll feel like he’s not getting a real chance, and then the next week I’ll think he’s never going to be anything, and then the one after that I’ll be in the middle before starting the whole cycle over again. It’s dizzying. See if we can’t make sense of it today with some separation from the season.

2019 Stats

58 gams, 156 PA

.264/.333/.564

9.6 BB%  25.0 K% 

11 HR  25 RBI

127 wRC+  .368 wOBA  .898 OPS

2.9 Defensive Runs Saved  1.5 WAR

Tell Me A Story: And that’s the thing. Look at those numbers for a third of a season. They’re really good. Like, really good. Even the defense! And yet didn’t you spend at least a portion of Happ’s time in Chicago this year thinking, “It’s never going to happen for this guy. Yet another 1st round miss! SAD!”  Of course you did. We all did. And yet there it is in black and white. He didn’t miss. So just what the fuck is going on here?

With Happ you almost have to go week-to-week or even game-by-game this year to try and get a handle on it. He was called up in late July, got five straight starts though only got two hits in them. But he did walk a ton in those. He then wouldn’t get a start for another week (huh?), earning them after doing some really nice work off the bench (a theme that would continue for the rest of the season). He would get a start the next six games, and in those he pretty much mashed, going 8-for-21 with three homers and only a few strikeouts. Happ started the next three games, only getting one hit, and then only get a start in three of the next eight. It was at this point that Anthony Rizzo got hurt the first time, and Happ would essentially get three straight starts at first, including the sweep of the Mets where he homered of Syndergaard.

It’s in the next stretch where Happ went cold, which seems to have defined his season at least in Maddon’s mind and probably mine. Happ would go 11-for-51 over the next couple weeks, starting either every other game at first and then every third and then none at all. And then of course Happ lit up the Pirates and Cardinals in the last week to give his numbers something of a shine. The games didn’t matter to the Cubs, but they did matter to the Cardinals, and it was only two games, so what the fuck do we make of it? If anything I’m more confused than I was. No one said it would be easy.

What we can say is that Happ had a rough couple weeks in there, which happens to everyone, and had it come earlier in the season or the Cubs with a comfortable lead in the division (and watching the Cardinals in the playoffs it’s even more galling that the Cubs somehow boned this so hard), Joe Maddon probably would just have let Happ play out of it. But given the urgency and time, he couldn’t. Or wouldn’t. I’m not sure. Neither are you. We’re sinking deeper and deeper here.

What we can say is that Happ did cut down his strikeouts this year, from being well over a third of the time to a quarter. That’s still not great, but you can live with it. And frankly in just these 58 games, he put up the same WAR he did in all of 2018 and nearly the same amount as 2017 which the Cubs are basing so much emotion on in the first place.

And while the Cubs harf-harf-harf about more contact, here they have a player who did make more contact. Happ raised his contact% from 77% in ’17 and 70% in ’18 to 82% in his cameo this year. That’s just a tick below league average, which for the Cubs is a goddamn bonanza. Is that real or just a splurge in limited playing time? No one knows, and our picture remains muddied and our lives unclear and the answers farther away. Eat Arby’s.

On the downside, Happ saw a major drop in the amount of line-drives he hit this time around, to about 15%. And an increase in grounders, which isn’t good. His exit-velocity dipped a touch as well. But again, given the sample size, it’s hard to know if this is a trend or just a spike or something in between. All we have is fog.

The book on Happ was that you could simply blow fastballs up in the zone by him all day, and he would murder you on low pitches. The latter still stayed basically the same, as Happ slugged .709 against sinkers this year. The real improvement for Happ came on breaking pitches. Where in the previous two years, he had only managed a .181 average on sliders and .225 on curves, those numbers this year were .529 and .421. He wasn’t cheating to the fastball and getting left out to dry and out ahead by anything.

Were high fastballs still a problem? Yes, of course. But Happ did show improvement in getting to them as a left-handed hitter in the middle or inside. Still not great, but moving in the right direction.

Perhaps the real upset here is that Happ graded out really well with the glove at second and in center. We think of him as a butcher in center, and the very few times they planted him between Castellanos and Schwarber we were pretty much watching with a book on our head. But the numbers suggest he was pretty good out there, with very positive UZR and UZR-150 numbers. I’m just telling you what they say.

Picture is not so clear now, is it?

Contract: Team Control, Arb Eligible in 2021

Welcome Back Or Boot In The Ass: When the season ended, Happ was probably a poster boy for a lot (and maybe even some in the front office) that think he’s the type of hitter the Cubs need to get away from. But that’s just not the case, or it wasn’t in 2019. Now, does that mean he should automatically be back? Not exactly. Given that he’s under team control, his pure athleticism that can have him deployed all over the diamond, the power that we know is there, and the at least somewhat encouraging signs of his abbreviated season in the Bigs, he might have some trade value and could help the Cubs get an arm they need.

That said, with the Cubs priorities having to be pitching and really pitching alone given what’s out there and what we think their budget constraints might be, and given that Happ makes pretty much nothing, he’s also extremely valuable to the Cubs. Or could be. At worst, he could start the season flipping with David Bote at second to keep the seat warm for Nico Hoerner while also getting starts in center. Again, he might be really improving out there. There are basically no center fielders to be gotten in free agency, unless you want to roll the dice on Brett Gardner‘s career-year, and you probably shouldn’t. Whatever trades the Cubs are going to make pretty much have to be for pitching. And if Happ stubs his toe again and the team needs someone in center, they’re more likely to find it at the deadline than in free agency.

Happ only just turned 25, which means he’s just about to enter his prime or just has. Yeah, the pitfalls there and his career feels like it’s careening along a mountain road with no guardrails. It could end with a beautiful view…or it could have a date with some very jagged rocks at very high speeds.

To me, Happ does too much–or has the potential to do too much–to not take one more look in 2020. There may be more answers here than we first thought.

Baseball

It’s the counter to “Fleabag,” clearly.

Most of the time, I enjoy doing these, just because I like digging around on FanGraphs or BrooksBaseball to find nuggets to explain things away. Or maybe because I just enjoy writing and talking about baseball that much. Today is not that day. We’re in this together, people. Strength in numbers. Here’s Addison Russell’s 2019, hopefully his last on the Northside.

2019 Stats

82 games, 241 PAs

.237/.308/.391

8.3 BB%  24.1 K%

9 HR  23 RBI

.297 wOBA . 81 wRC+  .699 OPS

3.3 Defensive Runs Saved  0.5 WAR

Tell Me A Story: Oh good god. Here’s the thing about Addison Russell: On the field (we’ll get to the whole story in a minute), it feels like a lot of people, including in the Cubs’ front office, had this impression that Russell has ever been a productive offensive player. He hasn’t. If you can avoid being blinded by the 98 RBI in 2016, which is a product of opportunity as much as skill if not more, he’s never had a wRC+ of 100 or a wOBA of over .320. When he put up the 95 wRC+ in 2016, it was justified in thinking that would eventually be a launch-point. Something he built off of. Well, he didn’t. That now looks like his ceiling, and one he’ll need a hell of a fucking stepladder to touch again.

Russell’s power (at least to hit baseballs hard) went away in 2018 and it didn’t come back this year in the least. Unless slugging percentages that almost don’t reach the .300s are your thing, and it would be if this were 1912. Russell is never going to hit for a high enough average to not hit for power and be effective, and he’s not fast enough to beat out infield hits or take extra bases either. More worryingly, Russell’s contact-type numbers are an exhibition of piss-poor-edness, even in this year of the SuperBall. Whether you go by hard-contact percentage (31%) or average exit velocity (86.3 MPH), it’s clear that Russell doesn’t do much other than breathe on the ball and passively send it on its way.

Oh, and most of that contact is on the ground. It’s a fiesta of suckitude.

A continuing theme with the Cubs hitters is that a good portion of them could be beat by fastballs not just above the zone, but high in the zone that they couldn’t just take. Russell was no different:

And it’s not like he could not swing at them either. In trying to catch up to them, Russell was also mucho susceptible to sliders, which he had a 41% whiff-per-swing rate on. You could get him out either way, whatever your mood that day.

There was a time when it looked like Russell might develop a more patient approach at the plate, with a 9% walk-rate in ’16 that could have grown. It didn’t, and he’s been below that in the three seasons since. Considering the lack of pop, Russell probably needs a walk-rate over 10% to even get a GPS to an effective hitter, and there’s no sign that’s going to happen.

When watching Russell, you get the impression his bat-speed just isn’t going to catch up to what MLB pitchers are throwing, and he can only feast on mistakes in the inner part of the zone. Russell just doesn’t have the power to go up the middle or the opposite field and be effective that way, nor really the patience to try.

Other than all that, he’s a fine hitter.

While it’s easy to remember all the errors, some egregious, over the half-season he played Russell’s defense actually grades out fine. And that will probably continue, and hey it might even get better were he to grow a brain at any point in his adult life.

Of course, the most galling thing about Russell is the lack of attention to anything on or off the field, as well as being a genuine scumbag. Russell seemingly hasn’t taken any responsibility for anything that he’s done, at least before Cubs media relations have to clean up his mess of the mouth and send him back out there with prepared statements.

It’s the far lesser crime, but that has leaked onto the field too. Russell’s lack of attention is the main thing holding him from being even a contributor, and he doesn’t seem to have any actual instincts for the game. At every other level his athleticism would get him through that, but not here. And moreover, he doesn’t seem to want to learn. I’m sure the signs on a Major League team are a tad more complicated than the ones we used in high school. But I also doubt the process of learning them is too much more than the three-minute talk we got minutes before the first game of the season. Yet Russell unfathomably told everyone he didn’t know them. After five seasons under the same manager. It’s a desolate and arid place, the space between his ears.

Contract: Arbitration eligible, MLBTR projects $5.1M for 2020

Welcome Back Or Boot In The Ass: The hardest of boots in the fleshiest part of his ass. Even if Russell weren’t a complete dolt and ghoul, it would appear a spot for him has disappeared. Starting shortstop is taken, and the Cubs are probably pretty determined to give second to Nico Hoerner before the All-Star break next year at the latest. Even at just that, $5M for this headache to be merely a fifth infielder is hardly worth it, and he would still have to provide offense he hasn’t looked close to producing in two seasons. Happ might not have his glove but the bat still has far more potential, and Bote can at least provide competency in both departments until it’s Hoerner’s show.

Now, I’ve been of the opinion that if the Cubs were truly sincere in their claims to want to guide Russell out of his dungeon of evil and stupidity into an actual addition to society, they can’t actually get rid of him. But the cover for them is to say they think he’s progressed enough as a person that he can be judged as any player would on the field, which would be enough justification to deposit him in whatever unfortunate dumpster that deserved better is nearby. Or they could claim he’s regressed in all areas. The bottom line is that his play on the field simply isn’t of a Major League level and it’s time for everyone to move on.

Russell will also be 26 come spring training, so one might conclude there just isn’t that much more room for improvement and this is probably what he is. We have basically four seasons of sample now. What do you see? Nothing that’s worth all this, both personally and professionally. Just a massive, massive failure.

 

Baseball

It’s funny that a bench player generates so much debate amongst a fanbase. Maybe it’s a result of signing a unique and somewhat unprecedented extension before the season. Maybe it’s just that David Bote was forced into more action than was ever planned thanks to Ben Zobrist’s four-month journey to catch the General Sherman. In the end, David Bote ended up being what David Bote was always intended to be: a pretty decent bench player. And he could be again.

2019 Stats

127 games, 356 PA

.257/.362/.422

12.4 BB%  26.1 K%

106 wRC+ .338 wOBA  .785 OPS

-1.4 Defensive Runs Saved  1.5 WAR

Tell Me A Story: The season started for Bote when he signed a five-year extension that averages out to about $3M a year, though the actual salary escalates every season. It’s rare, maybe even unheard of, for a role player to sign an extension before even hitting arbitration. Or more to the point, it’s rare for a team to agree to it. It was Bote’s idea, and you can see why. What did the Cubs get out of it?

Well, you have to look past the contract a bit. One, Bote had been a loyal soldier, who’d been in the minors for six years before making his debut in 2018. It’s not necessarily a bad thing to show all the other guys in that spot that if you keep working, and stick with it, the Cubs will reward you. Second, Bote is a player who took to changes the Cubs wanted him to make because he was hitting the ball extremely hard in the minors but almost always on the ground. He took off after the changes, and again, it’s not a bad thing to show the rest of your system that if you listen and take notes and do the things they tell you, you’ll get rewarded. Whatever, Bote’s salary isn’t breaking the structure here or anything.

The original plan for Bote would have been to cycle in occasionally at second, third when Bryant went to the outfield, and probably start no more than two-three times a week. If that. But that all got blown up when Zobrist first didn’t hit at all, and then left the team. That made Bote essentially the starting second baseman, not something that was ever in the design.

And much like 2018, Bote started out really hot, with a 127 wRC+ in March and April, and an acceptable 106 in May. But also like 2018, there was a period where it felt like the league figured out that if you didn’t throw him low fastballs, you would get him out. He was awful in June and July, but closed hard in August and September, mostly through walking a ton (21% in August, 17% in September). He also slugged .565 in August, so he recovered or discovered something.

Perhaps what confounded Joe Maddon and the Cubs a bit is that Bote was reverse-split this season. 115 wRC+ and a.349 wOBA against righties, 80 and .296 against lefties. Which kind of combines with Bote doing better and better work as the season went along on breaking balls, but ones that broke away from him. And he actually ended up struggling on fastballs as the season went on.

Bote seemed to be concentrating on getting the ball in the air more, and he did better work up in the zone this year than last. It cost him so hard contact though, as his exit velocity went from averaging over 90 MPH last year to just 87 MPS this year. But his line-drive rate went up five points, and his launch-angle doubled. The dream would be if he could ever blend the two, and the Cubs might be inclined to think he can.

The problem for Golden Years here is that he makes contact way too infrequently. It’s below 70%, which is miles away from league-average. And the Cubs are going to be seeking contact wherever they can get it. Much like Happ, Bote can miss in the zone, which is something the Cubs are going to have to find a way to lessen. And seeing as how Bote will be 27 next year, the room for chance and improvement isn’t as large as it would be for a younger player. Doesn’t mean it can’t happen.

Defensively, Bote was mostly fine at second and better at third, his natural position. He could have gotten the Cubs out of more games at short to give Javy a rest than Maddon ever tried, but that’s not a huge cudgel to bash Maddon with. His versatility is probably what will keep him around.

Contract: Signed through 2024 for a total of $15M, two team-option years after at $7M per

Welcome Back Or Boot In The Ass: Considering he only makes $960K next year, there would be no reason to not have him back. And the only way you’d lose him now is via trade, and even in that he’d probably be something of a throw-in. Or a very minor deal returning maybe a reliever? But there’s no need. The plan is likely to just keep second base warm until Nico Hoerner is ready to take over full-time, be that April or June. Bote and Happ can certainly give you league average production for a month or two while waiting, and then be more than serviceable bench players after that. Obviously the trap door to that strategy is if Hoerner never claims the spot, and Bote and Happ are left staring at each other for a whole season there. Assuming both are here.

Bote walks a ton, so that mitigates some of his swing-and-miss ways a bit. If he can find a way to make more contact in the zone–he was another who eschewed going the opposite way and probably needs more of that–as well as rediscovering some of his hard-contact, he has the chance to be a real weapon. You can do a hell of a lot worse than Bote as a fifth or sixth infielder.

Baseball

Most of this is going to be incomplete, as Zobrist had a strange ol’ season that only saw him play two months, the first and last. We don’t need to wade into why that was, so we’ll just get the on-field stuff out of the way.

2019 Stats

47 games, 176 PA

.260/.358/.313

1 HR  24 RBI

13.1 BB% . 13.6 K%

85 wRC+  .303 wOBA  .871 OPS

2.4 Defensive Runs Saved  0.2 WAR

Tell Me A Story: It’s nearly impossible to judge Zobrist’s 2019. It would be hard for anyone to miss the middle four months of the season at any age and then be productive in September, much less at 38. If he had simply been injured, not too much would have been expected of Zoby 18 and it would have been seen as the Hail Mary that it was to think he could help goose the lineup. Because it was something of a weird, personal leave there was a little more hope attached to it. But it was still the same task, and for the most part, Zo just wasn’t up to it.

He still took his walks, and he still had very good ABs, which he could probably do until he’s in his 60s if he so desired. But he showed none of the power that made a brief comeback in 2018 with reduced playing time. And without even the occasional double, Zobrist is a slap-hitting middle infielder with no speed and a barely average glove. That doesn’t get you a lot. Again, after missing that much time and doing very little, it was always going to be a longshot for him to find much else.

Perhaps the Cubs missed his presence in the dugout and the clubhouse more than we knew. While he’s never been a vocal guy, Zobrist was clearly very much liked and respected by his teammates and maybe he would have made more players answer for their looseness during the season in the field or on the bases. His approach at the plate certainly could have been copied more often, that’s for sure.

Still, Zobrist’s absence, which could not have been planned for, forced the Cubs to throw David Bote out at second far more than they would have wanted, and to keep trying science experiments like Addison Russell or Robel Garcia or Nico Hoerner there. The plan was almost certainly for Zobrist and Bote to split most of the ABs there during the year, which got torn up. Certainly Zobrist has every right to do what he needs to do for his well-being, but the Cubs front office can’t be blamed for having to come up with that solution on the fly. Of course, they used the freed up money to sign Craig Kimbrel…which worked out great and no one disagrees.

Contract: Free agent.

Welcome Back Or Boot In The Ass: Well, it won’t be a boot in the ass for the only World Series MVP in the team’s history and owner of the single biggest hit in the team’s history (and probably biggest play in Chicago sports history, if we’re honest). Even though Zobrist insisted he wants to keep playing, it won’t be here. He probably will hit for slightly more power if he does continue and plays a full year, but at 39 it won’t be much. He doesn’t kill you at second but that versatility he used to have that made him one of the more valuable players in the league is pretty much restricted to second and left now. The Cubs probably don’t want to do much more than hold second warm until Hoerner is ready to take over full-time midway through next year (unless he just takes it in spring training).

You could see a scenario where if Zobrist is willing to take a severe pay-cut and be happy with a bench role, filling in at second and left once or twice or week or so and giving you a good pinch-hit at-bat most games, the Cubs might consider it. Whether he stays or goes, his name will live a long time in these parts and he was one of the better free agent signings the Cubs made. Zobes rarely let you down and did just about everything correctly. You can go a long way with players like that. The Cubs did.